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This paper develops a model of credit, labor, and goods market fric-
tions introduced in a symmetrical way, withmatching functions associ-
ating, respectively, ﬁnancial institutions and “projects,” job seekers and
vacancies, and “selling ﬁrms” and “customers.” In particular, itA steady-state model of a non-
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16.05.006introduces a structure of search in the goods market and its relation to
income that facilitates the exposition of the main concepts and, impor-
tantly, implies a convenient recursive structure for the model. As a re-
sult, solutions in each market are derived sequentially with
equilibrium tightness in the goods market determined ﬁrst. This leads
to transparent and closed-form solutions characterizing a labor market
equilibrium, extending the canonical searchmodels. This also allows for
a transparent calibration to several European economies, determining
the role of entry costs in each of the three markets, the respective role
of price and wage markups, and ﬁnally the role of complementarities
between frictions in each market.
We then apply this model (called CLG) to three different econo-
mies: a ﬂexible, ﬁnance-driven economy (the UK), an economy
with wage moderation (Germany), and an economy with structural
rigidities (Spain). Our calibration strategy is to match moments on
each markets using ﬂows data in the labor market, capacityand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
1 A convenient intuition to think of the differences between the two goods is to think of
the twomain sources of heterogeneity across goods: spatial (similar goods are sold in dif-
ferent places), and horizontal (some differentiation across products). Both types of hetero-
geneity lead to higher search frictions. Goods 0 are goods for which search is small,
because they are sold in places known to the consumers and the degree of differentiation
is low enough, or because the consumer has kept a record of their location and character-
istics. Goods 1 are goods for which, either locations must be found or characteristics must
be investigated. Once consumed, though, they are not subject to search frictions, until the
consumption match dissolves.
2 T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxutilization rates for the goods market, and aggregate data from na-
tional accounts in the credit market. In these three countries, goods
and credit market frictions play a dominant role in entry costs.
They account for the largest part of total entry costs (more than
75%). In the goods market, adverse supply shocks are ampliﬁed
through their propagation to the demand side, as they also imply in-
come losses for consumers. This adds, at most, an additional 15% to
25% to the impact of the shocks. Finally, the speed of matching in
the goods market and the credit market accounts for a small fraction
of unemployment: most variation in unemployment comes from the
speed of matching in the labor market.
Goods market frictions were introduced in the classical search liter-
ature wtih consumers prospecting in the goods market in order to con-
sume (e.g., Diamond, 1971; Diamond, 1982). Diamond (1982) assumed
that two consumers were needed to consume indivisible units of goods
(the coconuts). Diamond (1971) instead assumed two sides in themar-
ket, consumers and sellers. Only consumers searched for different
shops. Shops were located in different places. The striking result of
Diamond (1971) was that prices would converge to the monopsony
price even with inﬁnitely small search costs.
A recent and growing literature has revived these ideas. A similar
logic where consumers and sellers are linked through a matching func-
tion in the goods market has been introduced in Wasmer (2009),
Lehmann and Van der Linden (2010), Bai et al. (2011), Michaillat and
Saez (2014), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015). In this paper, we
encompass these approaches and assume that ﬁrms have imperfect ac-
cess to ﬁnancial markets, then imperfect access to the labormarket, and
ﬁnally imperfect access to consumers. Consumers themselves face fric-
tions to consume certain goods and must spend time and resources to
access these search goods. As long as they are unsuccessful they have
excess income, which they spend on a non-frictional good playing the
role of a numeraire. This convenient assumption of a numeraire absorb-
ing the excess liquidity when agents do not access the search good is
reminiscent of the night-and-day markets in the search and money lit-
erature (Lagos and Wright, 2005; Nosal and Rocheteau, 2011). When
the frictionless market opens in these models, any excess liquidity is
absorbed so that agents start the next day being ex ante identical. This
has been a decisive step to simplify quite substantially the rich
money-search literature and develop its application in a large number
of domains.
Although in this paper we focus on steady-state relations be-
tween markets, existing work has studied interesting cyclical prop-
erties of goods market frictions, and in particular in relation to the
cyclical properties of intensive search margins (consumer search ef-
fort and shopping time, advertising efforts by ﬁrms). Procyclicality of
goods market search effort has been established in Hall (2012) for
advertising. Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2016) provide an empirical
test of the procyclicality of search effort by consumers. Their conclu-
sions stand in contrast to Kaplan and Menzio (2013), who argue in-
stead that consumer search effort is larger in recessions. The
implications for ﬁscal policy in the face of procyclical disposable in-
come, and the underlying question of ﬁscal multipliers, has been ex-
plored in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2014). In Bethune et al.
(2015), drops in demand from credit constrained consumers affect
the labor market through a search frictional goods market in which
ﬁrms' marginal revenue declines with the level of demand faced in
the goods market. This mechanism also appears in Petrosky-
Nadeau and Wasmer (2015).
Section 2 ﬁrst introduces search in the goods market and empha-
sizes several important differences from classical economies, including
labor search economies, that need to be clariﬁed. The general equilibri-
um properties of the model are derived in the steady-state in Section 3.
Price andwage bargaining solutions are explored in Section 4.We quan-
tify the role of each friction and the various complementarities between
markets in three different European economies in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.0062. A model with search in goods markets
2.1. Setup
Time is continuous. Consumers have access to two types of goods:
(i) one type of good is accessible with no frictions, indexed by 0, can
be thought of as a set of inferior goods (food, basic services, standard
goods), and its price is normalized to unity; (ii) the other type of
good, indexed by 1, is subject to search frictions, and can either be
interpreted as services or the ﬂow consumption of a durable good
such as cars, housing service, etc. This second good is produced by
ﬁrms, while goods 0 will be produced by consumers, as discussed
below.1
Hence, goods 0 are the goods regularly consumed without the need
to search for them. Instead, goods 1 represent goods needing new
search from time to time, due to both the arrival on the market of new
consumption goods (e.g., a new restaurant in the neighborhood, a
new brand of consumption good), or replacement of old goods previ-
ously consumed and hit by various shocks, speciﬁed below, such as
changes in “consumer tastes” or the inability of ﬁrms to produce the
good for a period of time.
2.2. The life cycle of a new good
Anew search good can beproduced through the following sequence.
First, the ﬁrm develops a new project. The ﬁrm can be either an entirely
new ﬁrm or an existing ﬁrm. In the latter case, this is the marginal pro-
ject of that ﬁrm. This project has to beﬁnanced externally. Hence, in this
early stage denoted by c, the ﬁrm attempts to form a ﬁrst match with a
ﬁnancial intermediary. The intermediary and the “project” subsequent-
ly form a block that is called a “ﬁrm.” However, this match can break
down from time to time following exogenous events, dissolving the
match in the ﬁnancial market. Second, this newly formed block recruits
a worker in a stage denoted by v according to the standard labor
matching process. Third, once the worker is recruited, the ﬁrm is able
to produce and advertise to sell its good, and begins to search actively
for a consumer. However, the ﬁrm does not generate proﬁts yet. In the
third phase of the life cycle of a ﬁrm, “search in the goods market” indi-
cated by subscript g, the ﬁrmmakes no revenue and incurs losses due to
wage payments and operating costs. This stage precedes the ﬁnal proﬁt
stage called stage π, in which it can sell to consumers and generate
proﬁts. Fig. 1 summarizes the timing and notation of the various transi-
tions between the different stages.
In the special case of the absence of search frictions in the goods
market, stages g and π are confounded. In that limiting case, stage g
lasts an inﬁnitely small amount of time. Instead, with a period of a pos-
itive length in stage g, the ﬁrm has to pay thewage to its worker, denot-
ed bywg. In stage π, after meeting with a consumer, the ﬁrmwill obtain
a price per period P from the consumer who will purchase the ﬂow of
service of the goods, as a long-term relationship. This assumption char-
acterizes the existence of speciﬁcity in the match formed in the goods
market. The ﬁrm pays a wage wπ.
2.3. Random matching in labor and credit markets
As in Wasmer and Weil (2004), denote by p the rate at which the
project,N c, meets the creditor,Bc, and by p̌ the rate atwhich the creditorand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Fig. 1. Timing and transition rates of a marginal project producing the search good: credit
destruction sCk,k= v,g,π, labor turnover sLk,k= g,π and taste shocks τ; creditmatching rate
p(ϕ), labor hiring rate q(θ) and goods market matching rate λ(ξ).
2 The assumption that only employed workers may search for the frictional good is
made for tractability, and captures the main channel of transmission from the labor to
the goods market. Alternative assumptions, such as allowing the unemployed to search
as well as the employed, introduce additional interactions between labor and goods mar-
kets (see Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2015).
3T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxmeets—and implicitly both screens and accepts—the project. There is an
identity in the ﬁnancial market between the total number of matches,
MC, the number of matched projects and the number of matched cred-
itors in a unit of time:MC ¼ pN c ¼ p ̌Bc. The ratio of projects to creditors
searching in the credit market,ϕ ¼ N c=Bc, is a measure of conditions in
the ﬁnancial market called ﬁnancial market tightness, and p ̌ = ϕp.
Matching is governed by a constant returns to scale function with the
mass of investment projects and creditors searching in the ﬁnancial
market as arguments:
MC N c;Bcð Þ with ∂ logMC=∂ log Bc ¼ ηC ϕð Þ ð1Þ
where ηC(ϕ) is the elasticity ofmatching in theﬁnancialmarketwith re-
spect to searching investment projects. The transition rates for invest-
ment projects and creditors are functions of credit market tightness
with p′(ϕ) b 0 and pˇ 0ðϕÞN0.
Similarly, following the macro-labor literature and Pissarides
(2000), we assume the existence of a constant returns to scalematching
function in the labor market:
ML ¼ML V;Uð Þ with ∂ logML=∂ logU ¼ ηL θð Þ ð2Þ
where θ ¼ V=U is a measure of labor market tightness and ηL(θ) is the
elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment. We denote by
f(θ) the per-unit of time rate at which unemployed workers ﬁnd a job
equal to f ðθÞ ¼ ML=U , and qðθÞ ¼ ML=V the corresponding hiring rate
from the ﬁrm's perspective. We have f(θ) ≡ θq(θ) and q′(θ) ≤ 0.
2.4. Goods market
We denote the number of consumers matched with goods 1 or un-
matched by DM and DU , respectively. We also denote by N π and N g
the number of selling and searchingﬁrms (for consumers), respectively.
The total number of employed workers is therefore equal to the total
number of ﬁrms in each stage, that is:
1−U ¼ N π þN g :
We also assume that each ﬁrm can serve only one consumer. This
further implies:
DM ≡N π :
This is therefore a one-ﬁrm/one-worker/one-consumermodel.
As in the standard search and matching models, we introduce the
tightness of the goods market as
ξ ¼ DUN g : ð3Þ
It follows that the transition rates for ﬁrms and for consumers are
given, respectively, by
MG DU ;N g
 
N g ¼ λ ξð Þ with dλ=dξN0 ð4ÞPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006MG DU ;N g
 
DU ¼ λ ξð Þ=ξ ¼ λˇ ξð Þ with dλˇ =dξ b 0: ð5Þ
The total number of prospective consumers, that is, the consumers
willing to exert search effort in the goods market to be able to consume
search good 1, has to be determined. We assume that only employed
workers, who have access to a full salary, can consume search good 1.
That is, we are assuming that all income available to the unemployed
is spent on essential goods; the unemployed have no additional dispos-
able income to spend on the search good.2 In this simpliﬁed economy
with two goods, one (good 0) is the essential good while the other
(goods 1) is a normal good or even, in the current case, a luxury good
not accessible to the unemployed. It follows that the sum of unmatched
and matched consumers of goods 1 sums up to total employment:
DU þDM ¼ 1−U:
2.5. Match destruction
Labor relations in stage g and π dissolve at an exogenous Poisson rate
sLk, with k= g,π. Credit relations in stage v, g, and π dissolve at an exog-
enous Poisson rate sCk, with k= v,g,π. Although in the calibration exer-
cise, these differences in separation rates across stages will not be very
important, distinguishing themwill have the virtue of following careful-
ly the role of each parameter in the single free-entry equation condens-
ing all the margins of themodel derived in the next section. In addition,
we denote by sLg,π and sCg,π the average of these shocks across stages g
and π: sLg;π ¼ ðN gsLg þN πsLπÞ=ðN g þN πÞand sCg;π ¼ ðN gsCg þN πsCπÞ=
ðN g þN πÞ.
Consumer relations also dissolve, for two main reasons. First, the
consumers of goods 1 may change tastes, leading to a separation of
the consumer–seller relationship. Such a separation event arrives with
Poisson intensity τ. Second, turnover in either the labor or credit market
may terminate aworker's employment. The resulting loss of purchasing
power arrives on average at rate sLg,π+ sCg,π depending on whether the
consumer is in a ﬁrm at stage g or π. This is unobserved by the selling
ﬁrm. It follows that the rate of consumption-match termination sG is
the sum of the pure taste shock the consumer income shocks. We use
the compact notation sG = τ+ sLg,π + sCg,π.
2.6. Additional notation and concepts
2.6.1. Unused production capacity
There are unused resources at theﬁrm level. Firms have the ability to
produce, but cannot necessarily sell unless they ﬁnd a consumer. Pro-
duction takes place only when a match with the consumer has been
formed. Therefore, the ﬁrm does not use its capacity to produce in the
stage where it has no consumer. The search frictions in the goods mar-
ket introduce a new concept, the rate of capacity utilization. This can be
deﬁned as
μG ¼
N π
N π þN g : ð6Þ
The rate of capacity utilization is the ratio of ﬁrms matched with a
consumer, N π , to the total number of ﬁrms matched with a worker
who could, potentially, produce, N π þN g ¼ N . This rate is a widely
available statistic and will be used subsequently for calibrating the fric-
tional economy.and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
4 T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxx2.6.2. Transfers, Lucas trees, and the circular ﬂows of income in the
economy
The ﬁrm receives a unit price P from consumers in exchange for x
units of goods 1 produced. The good produced is assumed to be indivis-
ible: it must be fully consumed by the consumer. Here, xmust therefore
be interpreted as quality of the good, entering the utility function of the
consumer. The consumer must, in addition, have the resources at the
time of the meeting with the ﬁrm to pay for the price P. No credit is
allowed to customers, unlike Bethune et al. (2015) and Branch et al.
(2016), in which there is consumer credit.
At each point in time, there is a mass μGð1−UÞ ¼ μGN of ﬁrms in
stage π that is both producing and selling goods 1. In the aggregate,
ﬁrms generate gross revenues μGNPx, and have total wage and search
costs ½μGwπ þ ð1−μGÞwg N þ γV . A fraction μG of ﬁrms, those in a
goods market match, pay the wage wπ, while the other ﬁrms pay the
wagewg. The difference between gross revenue and costs, the net reve-
nues generated by ﬁrms in this economy, is rebated to unemployed
workers as well as employed workers in equal shares. Denote by KU
and KW the dividends received by, respectively, the unemployed and
employed, in the aggregate.
Importantly, workers receive additional resources, expressed in
terms of the numeraire good 0, that are the fruits (in numeraire) of a
Lucas tree growing in their individual garden. Each agent is endowed
in each unit of time a quantity y0 of additional resources. Hence, total
disposable income of employed workers is now:
μGPxþ y0
 
N−γV−KU ≶ μGNPx: ð7Þ
In the absence of the Lucas tree (y0 ¼ 0), and given the discussion
above, consumers' aggregate net income is below the value of sales of
goods 1 N πPx.32.6.3. Utility, individual and aggregate consumption
The utility function of consumers depends on the consumption of
both goods 1 and 0, and of leisure denoted by l. It is denoted by
v(c1,c0,l) where the ﬁrst input is consumption of the search good, the
second of the numeraire, and the third leisure. We denote by cU0 and
cM
0 the consumption of the numeraire by, respectively, the employed un-
matchedwith a search good and employed matchedwith a search good.
Wenormalize leisure so that employedworkers consumeno leisure and
unemployedworkers may consume up to a ﬁxed quantity of leisure de-
noted by z. Unmatched consumers are employed and therefore have no
leisure, and a ﬂowutility v(0,cU0,0).Matched consumers have a ﬂowutil-
ity v(x,cM0 ,0).
The viability of the search economy requires that consumers prefer
the frictional good to the numeraire, otherwise they would not search
for good 1. The equilibriummust therefore be such that:
v x; c0M
 
Nv 0; c0U
 
:
The unemployed can freely transformpart or all their leisure endow-
ment z into additional production of the numeraire, which ensures an
equilibrium between demand and supply of the numeraire. Since the
exact quantity of leisure transformed is irrelevant to themarket equilib-
rium, we only report these calculations in Appendix A.3 Under low values of y0, consumers would be unable to purchase the search good. A
non-degenerate equilibrium thus requires a positive and large enough value of y0 so that
a nontrivial equilibrium exists. As evident from Eq. (7), this endowment must be greater
than the sum of labor search costs and the share of dividends accruing to the unemployed,
γV þ KU
Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
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3.1. Equilibrium determination strategy
Once the setup of the model has been established, we can detail the
strategy of ﬁnding the steady-state equilibrium. On each of the three
markets (C, L, G) the equilibrium is characterized by price (ψ;w;PÞ
andmarket tightness (ϕ,θ,ξ). Note that thewage, at this stage, is thought
of as a vector since itmay differ across stages of the life-cycle of the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst step is to treat prices as parameters andﬁnd three equations for
tightness in each market.
Step 1. Given prices,we solve formarket tightnesses (ϕ,θ,ξ).We use the
assumptions of two free-entry conditions in the credit market
(for projects and creditors) to determine credit market tight-
ness. The assumption that only the employed consume leads
to determine goods market tightness ξ as the solution to the
ﬁxed-point problem independent of the equilibrium in other
markets. The model is block recursive for these two tightnesses.
This leaves us with a job creation equation to determine labor
market tightness, which depends on wages and prices of the
goods: θ ¼ Θðw;PÞ.
Step 2. Prices (ψ;w;PÞ are solutions to Nash-bargaining problems. The
value of repayment ψ=Ψ(θ) can be determined as a function
of labor market tightness only. The good 1 price P is indepen-
dent of market tightness. The wage vector depends on labor
market tightness: w=W(θ).
Step 3. We prove existence and uniqueness of the solution to the sys-
tem θ ¼ ΘðWðθÞ;PÞÞ, and compute the equilibrium value of θ.
Once this part of themodel is solved, we can calculate the remaining
stocks: (i) the steady-state stock-ﬂow equation for unemployment give
U as a function of θ. Then, we obtain also V ¼ θU ; (ii) the steady-
state stock-ﬂow equation for proﬁtable ﬁrms give N g and N π (once ξ
and U are known); (iii) knowing ξ and N g yields a solution for DU,
and assuming one-consumer/one-product relations gives DM ¼ N π ;
(iv) the steady-state stock-ﬂow equation for vacancies givesN c as a func-
tion of θ;ϕ;N g ; andN π, and ﬁnally (v) we obtain Bc since ϕ is known
and ϕ ¼ N c=Bc.3.2. Bellman equations and free-entry
Upon the realization of either of the two labor market separation
shocks, sLk for k= g, π, the ﬁrm returns to the vacancy stage v in the
entry equilibrium. Similarly, under the realization of any of the
three capital market separation shocks, sCk for k = v,g,π, the ﬁrm
returns to the credit stage. Fig. 1 summarizes the timing of the var-
ious transitions.
Let Ec, Ev, Eg, and Eπ be the respective steady-state asset values of an
entrepreneur in each period (credit stage, labor stage, goods stage, and
proﬁt). Let Bc, Bv, Bg, and Bπ be the respective steady-state asset values of
a bank in each period (credit stage, labor stage, goods stage, and proﬁt).
The corresponding equations are in Appendix B. Under the assumption
of free-entry, meaning each marginal project can enter the credit-stage
freely, one has Bc = 0 and Ec = 0. Denote by Jv, Jg and Jπ the ﬁrm value,
that is of Ek + Bk for k= v,g,π, the block formed by the “project” in dif-
ferent stages and the ﬁnancial intermediary.
We deﬁne K(ϕ) as a measure of the total expected cost of ﬁnancial
intermediation, as the sum of expected cost of ﬁrms searching for a
bank and of the expected cost of the bank searching for a suitable pro-
ject to ﬁnance, that is,
K ϕð Þ ¼ κB
ϕp ϕð Þ þ
κ I
p ϕð Þ :and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
4 This result, when the ratio ðN g þN πÞ=ðDM þDUÞ is equal to 1, arises from the appar-
ently innocuous assumption that only the employedworkers search for the search good. It
can be interpreted as a stochastic version of the old Say's law that demand equals supply.
The ﬁrm produces one good, each consumer consumes one good, and each ﬁrm employs
one employee-consumer. If instead eachﬁrm employed, say, twoworkers, this would lead
to the creation of two consumers and thus goodsmarket tightness would be equal to 2, in
the steady state. If conversely, each ﬁrm produced two units of goods, each worker-
consumer would be able to consume two units of goods (in another ﬁrm) and therefore
goodsmarket tightnesswould be equal to half unity. Adapting this logic, if each ﬁrm could
produce nq units and employed nw workers, the steady-state goods market tightness
would be equal to nw/nq. Nonetheless, goods market tightness would still be a constant,
a simple function of simple parameters.
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r þ sCv  Jv ¼ r þ sCv K ¼−γ þ q θð Þ Jg− Jv  ð8Þ
r þ sCg  Jg ¼−wg þ sLg Jv− Jg þ λ Jπ− Jg  ð9Þ
r þ sCπ  Jπ ¼ xP−wπ þ sLπ Jv− Jπð Þ þ sG Jg− Jπ : ð10Þ
The entire model can therefore be collapsed into a single equation
linking entry costs and future expected proﬁts, by combining the recur-
sive equations above and eliminating the value functions. We have (see
Appendix B for a proof):
1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q θð Þ þ
1
1−QπQg
wg−sLgK
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ
 
Entry costs in credit; labor and goods markets
¼ Qg
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
 
Present discounted value of profits
with
Qg ¼
λ
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ ;Qπ ¼
sG
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG :
ð11Þ
The left-hand side is the sum of three terms, expressed in future
value of the vacancy stage. The ﬁrst term is the value of ﬁnancial
costs, the second term is the value of hiring costs, the third term is
the value of wages net of the recovery costs K after labor turnover
in stage g. The right-hand side is the expected discounted value of
proﬁts and recovery cost after labor turnover in stage π. It turns out
that labor market tightness, if it exists, is a function of price and
wages: θ ¼ Θðwg ;wπ ;PÞ.
Wewill extensively study this equation and in particular calculate its
different components in the quantitative exercise. The expression has
various limiting cases capturing the intuition of the decomposition
above.
3.2.1. CL model with perfect goods market: λ→+∞, Qg→1
In this limiting case, one obtains that the entry costs due to ﬁnancial
markets and the hiring costs in the labor market add up and must be
equal to the present-discounted value of proﬁts:
1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q
¼ xP−wπ þ s
LπK
r þ sLπ þ sCπ : ð12Þ
3.2.2. LG model with perfect credit markets: K→0
In this limiting case, one obtains that entry costs are the sum of hir-
ing costs and deﬁcits of theﬁrmwhen it does not sell, and they are equal
to the properly discounted sum of proﬁts in stage π. Note that credit
shocks sC (whereby the ﬁrm is back to the entry stage Ec = 0) could
be eliminated, but the absence of credit market imperfection does not
imply the absence of such destructive shocks:
γ
q
þ 1
1−QπQg
wg
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ
 
¼ Qg
1−QπQg
xP−wπ
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
 
: ð13Þ
3.2.3. L model with both perfect credit and goods market: K→0 and
λ→+∞, Qg→1
In this limiting case, one reverts to the standard Pissarides equation
where entry costs are equal to future discounted proﬁts:
γ
q
¼ xP−wπ
r þ sLπ þ sCπ : ð14ÞPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.0063.3. Steady-state solutions for goods and credit market tightness
Going back to the general case of frictions in three markets, the
model is solved recursively. The ﬁrst step is to derive equilibrium
goods market tightness. This is easily obtained from the steady-
state equations governing the evolution of the various stocks to:
(i) employment in goods market matched ﬁrms; (ii) employment
in unmatched ﬁrms in the goods market; (iii) unemployment; (iv)
vacancies; (v) matched consumers; and (vi) unmatched consumers.
The equations for the stocks are (see Appendix C for details):
N π þN g ¼ 1þ λ= sLg;π þ sG
  	N g ð15Þ
DM þDU ¼ 1þ λˇ = sLg;π þ sG
 DUh ð16Þ
λþ sLg;π N g ¼ N πsG þML U;Vð Þ ð17Þ
ML U;Vð Þ ¼ sLg;π 1−Uð Þ ð18Þ
N g þN π ¼ 1−U ð19Þ
DU þDM ¼ 1−U: ð20Þ
One can solve the six stock variables with the six equations above.
Goodsmarket tightness is the ratio of ﬁrmswilling to sell to prospective
consumers. Using the ratio of Eqs. (15) and (16) on the one hand, and
along with the fact that N g þN π ¼ DU þDM from Eqs. (19) and (20),
we have that:
N g þN π
DM þDU ¼
1þ λ= sLg;π þ sG 
1þ λˇ = sLg;π þ sGð Þ
N g
DU ¼ 1: ð21Þ
Property 1. (steady-state goods market tightness). Consumption tight-
ness ξ in a steady-state is equal to 1 if only the employed workers have ac-
cess to the frictional good:
DU þDM ¼ N ⇒ ξ ¼ 1: ð22Þ
The proof amounts to solving a ﬁxed point problem:
ξ ¼ 1þ λ ξð Þ= s
Lg;π þ sG 
1þ λˇ ξð Þ= sLg;π þ sGð Þ: ð23Þ
Using λˇ ðξÞ ¼ λðξÞ=ξ , it is easy to see that ξ = 1 is one such ﬁxed
point. It can be shown that, under an Inada condition on the matching
function, there is a second ﬁxed point ξ= 0 corresponding to a degen-
erate case with nomarket. This would be a subsistence economywhere
everyone consumes thenumeraire in quantity y0. There is noother ﬁxed
point for a standard matching function. When ξ N 0, one has ξ+ λ(ξ)/
(sLg,π + sG) = 1 + λ(ξ)/(sLg,π + sG), which leads immediately to
ξ= 1.4 This property determines not only goods market tightness, butand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
6 T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxalso the value of transition rates in the goods market. Hence, from now
on, we have λˇ ð1Þ ¼ λð1Þ ¼ λ.
In regards to the repaymentψ from theﬁrm to the creditor in stage π,
it is the solution to the following conventional Nash bargaining game:
ψ ¼ argmax Bv−Bcð ÞαC Ev−Ecð Þ1−αC
where αC ∈ (0,1) is the relative bargaining strength of the creditor. The
solution to this problem depends on the assumed effect of the repay-
ment ψ on the wage to labor w. Under the assumption that, from the
perspective of bargaining in the ﬁnancial market, the future wage w
paid to the worker does not depend on the repayment ψ, the slopes of
the value of the proﬁt stage for both the creditor and the project are
equal in absolute value. That is, ∂Bπ/∂ψ=−∂Eπ/∂ψ = 1/(r + sT)
where sT = sG + sLπ + sCπ.
It then follows that the absolute value of slopes for the asset values of
the labor search stage are also equal: ∂Bv/∂ψ=−∂Ev/∂ψ = QL × 1/
(r+ sT). The Nash sharing rule forΨ can thus be written as:
1−αCð Þ Bv−Bcð Þ ¼ αC Ev−Ecð Þ: ð24Þ
The sharing rules can be rearranged as Bv=αC Jv and Ev=(1−αC)Jv,
which states that the creditor receives a share αC of thematch surplus Jv,
while a share (1−αC) accrues to the project. Recall that free entry in the
ﬁnancialmarket leads to values of the labor search stage Bv= κB/(ϕp(ϕ))
and Ev = κI/p(ϕ).
Property 2. (steady-state creditmarket tightness).Combining the above
equations with the equation for Nash bargaining over the repayment
(Eq. (24)) one reaches a unique solution for ﬁnancial market tightness,
ϕ∗ and repayment ψ:
ϕ ¼ κB
κ I
1−αC
αC
ð25Þ
ψ
r þ sT ¼ αC
xP−wπ
r þ sT þ 1−αCð Þ
1−QgQπ
Qg
 γ
q θð Þ þ
wg
λ
 
ð26Þ
Equilibrium ﬁnancialmarket tightness, represented in Eq. (25), is in-
creasing in the ratio of search costs for creditor κB to the ﬂow search
costs for investment project κI. An increase in κB leads to fewer creditors
searching in the market and hence a longer duration of search for pro-
jects. In contrast, if the creditor receives a larger share of the credit
match surplus, and thus a larger share of the value of a job opening
and the proﬁt ﬂows during production, the free entry equilibrium will
have lowerﬁnancialmarket tightness. This second propertywas proved
inWasmer andWeil (2004). The present discounted value of the repay-
ment to the creditor during theproﬁt stage,ψ/(r+ sT), is anαCweighted
average of the future proﬁt stream to the creditor-project match, ðxP−
wπÞ=ðr þ sT Þ, and their past search costs in the labor and goodsmarkets.
Under perfect goodsmarket, λ→∞, Qg=1, andQπ=0. In this case, the
second term converges to γ/q(θ).
Themodel is now partially solved since the ﬁrst two blocks,ﬁnancial
and goods market tightnesses, are fully determined. Price and wages
now remain to be solved for, which is done next.
4. Bargaining relations in labor and goods market
Before solving for wages, one can ﬁrst simplify the structure of the
model. Having different turnover rates by stage of the ﬁrm led to trans-
parent interpretations of the various parameters in the entry Eq. (11).
From now on, however, we can simplify the turnover structure of the
model by assuming sLg = sLπ = sL and sCv = sCg = sCπ = sC, giving us:
r Jv ¼−γ þ q Jg− Jv
 
þ sC Jc− Jvð Þ ð27ÞPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006r Jg ¼−wg þ λ Jπ− Jg
 
þ sC Jc− Jg
 
þ sL Jv− Jg
 
ð28Þ
r Jπ ¼ xP−wπ þ sC Jc− Jπð Þ þ sG Jg− Jπ
 
þ sL Jv− Jπð Þ: ð29Þ
At each step, the existence of search frictions creates rents and those
rents are conveniently split by Nash-bargaining. Nash-bargaining is
commonly applied in the literature and this allows for easier compara-
bility. We ﬁrst start with a simple sequence of events where labor and
goods lead to bilateral negotiations in each market, with shares of the
ﬁrm/project being respectively 1−αL and 1−αG, that is, the residual
of the shares αL and αG of the match surpluses going to, respectively,
the worker and the consumer. To simplify the exposition, we start
with the case of a perfect creditmarket and then generalize. That is, Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 present ﬁrst the solution with no credit frictions (K=
0) called the LG model and then extend it easily to the case K N 0 (CLG
model). Appendix B also derives the full case with K N 0 and different
turnover rates across stages of the ﬁrm's life-cycle.
4.1. Price determination under perfect ﬁnancial markets
Consumer–producer relationships are costly to create as they re-
quire several steps with direct costs (search) and have related opportu-
nity costs. It is therefore natural to adopt a price determination rule that
is the outcome of bargaining between the ﬁrm and the consumer. In
what follows, on price and wage determination, we assume that
bargaining takes places at the time of the meeting.
In addition, we make the simplifying assumption that workers are
paid the same wage w whether or not their employer is matched with
a consumer. This implies thatwg=wπ=w, an assumptionwhich great-
ly simpliﬁes the analysis without being central to the main results. Ri-
gidities, in the spirit of Gertler and Trigari (2009), can justify this
assumption. Alternatively, this equality of wages would arise in the
presence of collective bargaining betweenworkers and ﬁrms. Addition-
al alternative assumptions are discussed in the concluding section, and
they do not qualitatively alter the main results. Different wages and al-
ternative timing are fully explored in Appendix F.
A newly employed worker is, by deﬁnition, a consumer not yet
matched with a product in the goods market. This worker's present
discounted utility is denoted byWn0. After a period of random search,
(s)he reaches the consumption stage 1 in which (s)he consumes the
frictional good. The present discounted utility in this stage is denoted
by Wn1. At any time, the consumer may be hit by a labor turnover
shock, thus moving to unemployment and a present discounted utility
ofWu. This arises with probability per unit of time sL. Finally, a matched
consumer may exit the consumption match but remain employed if a
goodsmatch termination shock occurs. These arrive at rate sG, which in-
cludes both the taste shock τ, and the possible disruption of production
due to the risk of labor turnover sL. In both cases, the consumer returns
to the goods market search stage with asset valueWn0.
The Bellman equations of consumers, using the earlier result that
λˇ ð1Þ ¼ λð1Þ ¼ λ in a stationary equilibrium, are:
rWn0 ¼ v 0; y0 þw;0
 
þ λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ þ sL Wu−Wn0ð Þ ð30Þ
rWn1 ¼ v x; y0 þw−Px;0
 
þ sL Wu−Wn1ð Þ þ sG Wn0−Wn1ð Þ ð31Þ
rWu ¼ v 0; y0; z
 
þ f θð Þ Wn0−Wuð Þ ð32Þ
where the last equation is based on the fact that the unemployed have
an additional z units of leisure. The surplus of the consumer, Wn1−
Wn0, is the difference in its valuation of the consumption stage and the
search stage. Subtracting Eq. Eq. (30) from Eq. Eq. (31), we have theand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
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0þw−PxÞ−vð0;y0þwÞ
rþsLþsGþλ . The main re-
sults are clear under a linear utility setup.While richer dynamics require
some concavity in utility vwith respect to goods 0, the exposition of the
main concepts of the LG model can accommodate a linear utility. As-
sume that v(x,c0) = Φx + c0 + l, where the marginal utility of goods
0 is 1 (hence it is a numeraire), and the marginal utility of goods 1 is
Φ N 1. A non-degenerate equilibrium will therefore require ΦNP .
Under these preferenceswe obtain a simpler expression for the the con-
sumer's surplus:
Wn1−Wn0 ¼ Φx−Pxr þ sL þ sG þ λ :
The production of goods 0 has disappeared from the consumption
surplus due to the assumption of linearity. The surplus from a goods
market match is the present discounted value of ﬂow net utility from
consumption of the search good ðΦ−PÞx. In a Walrasian market, for
comparison, the price is the marginal utility of consumption of the
good, and the consumer surplus is driven to zero at the equilibrium
price.
In this search frictional goods market, prices are bargained and set
according to a Nash-sharing rule. The price is the solution to
P ¼ argmax Wn1−Wn0ð ÞαG Jπ− Jg
 1−αG ð33Þ
where αG ∈ (0,1) is the consumer's bargaining weight. The price must
therefore satisfy the share rule Wn1−Wn0 ¼ αG1−αG ð Jπ− JgÞ. The ﬁrm's
surplus with respect to the consumer relation is, subtracting
Eq. Eq. (28) from Eq. Eq. (29): Jπ− Jg ¼ Px−wπþwgrþsLþsGþλ .
If we make the earlier simplifying assumption that wg = wπ, the
wage cancels out of the surplus of the ﬁrm. Combining the deﬁnitions
on the consumer and ﬁrm goods market surpluses with the Nash shar-
ing rule leads to the bargained price:
Px ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦx: ð34Þ
The price depends on the marginal utility for the good, Φ, and the
relative bargaining power of the seller (1−αG). The property that the
price is a function of consumer preferences and bargaining parameters
is a general one. It also arises when the wage is allowed to vary across
stages g and π.
4.2. Wage determination under perfect ﬁnancial markets
Wemake the assumption of an identical wagew at idle ﬁrms (stage
g) and selling ﬁrms (stage π):w=(wg,wπ)= (w,w). This wage is nego-
tiated when the ﬁrm is in the goods market stage g. As we saw in the
previous section, this assumption on wage implies that the wage does
not affect the capital gain from a match in the goods market for either
the consumer or the ﬁrm. The wage drops out of the expression of a
match surplus for both the consumer and the ﬁrm.
The bargained wage is the outcome of
w ¼ argmax Jg− Jv
 1−αL
Wn0−Wuð ÞαL
leading to the labor match surplus sharing rule: (1−αL)(Wn0−Wu) =
αL( Jg− Jv). Using the deﬁnition of the asset values, the wage can be
expressed as a function of the ﬁrm's surplus with respect to the
consumer:
w ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0
 
þ αL−αG
1−αG
 
λ Jπ− Jg
 
and then using the expression for the seller's surplus in the previous
subsection and the discounting term Qg′ = λ/(r + sL + sG + λ), thePlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006wage in the labormarket can be linked to the price in the goodsmarket:
w ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αLγθþ αL−αG1−αG
 
Q 0gPx: ð35Þ
Again, simpler cases lead to the main intuitions. The Pissarides case
is obtained when Qg′ = 1 (frictions in the goods market disappear)
and when the ﬁrm does not lose any surplus to consumers (αG =
0), w ¼ ð1−αLÞzþ αLðγθþ PxÞ.
In the general case, replacingPxby its equilibrium value further sim-
pliﬁes the wage equation to:
w ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αLγθþ αL−αGð ÞQ 0gΦx: ð36Þ
The term (αL−αG)Qg′Φx canmore easily be understood by rewriting
it as−(1−αL)Qg′Φx+(1−αG)Qg′Φx. Theﬁrst, negative term, is awork-
er threat point effect: by having higher marginal utility Φx from
consuming the search good, the worker has more to lose from a break-
down in negotiations as the unemployed lose access to the search good.
The second one is a consumer surplus effect: the ﬁrm obtains a fraction
(1−αG) of the marginal utility of the search good, and this leads to a
higher wage. Simplifying, one obtains an impact of Φx that is linear in
αL−αG. Note however that the value of αL−αG is always positive: if
the bargaining power of consumers were above that of workers, this
would imply that the ﬁrm would give up more to the worker than
what it can expect from the sales, and the total surplus would be nega-
tive in stage g. In the special case where theworker's bargainingweight
in the labor market is equal to the consumer's bargaining weight in the
goods market, αL = αG, the consumption surplus for the ﬁrm and the
wage no longer depends on the price in the goods market or changes
in the marginal revenue from production.
Viability conditions ensure that the decentralized equilibrium is not
degenerate. The full conditions are easily derived. To summarize these
conditions, it is necessary for wages to fall into the interval ðxP−y0; xPÞ
where y0 is the transfer of numeraire (income) in addition to the labor in-
come. This means that workers can pay for the goods in numeraire and
theﬁrm canpayworkers above the selling price. This condition is satisﬁed
if the supply of numeraire y0 is large enough compared to a combination
of parameters involvingαL andαG aswell as x,z and θ. Another condition is
that unemployed workers cannot consume the inelastic supply of the
search good x, which is the case when y0b xP ¼ ð1−αGÞΦx.
4.3. Prices and wages under imperfect credit markets
Wenowneed to establish the setting of wages in order to determine
equilibrium labor market tightness.
The prices in all three markets, the repayment to the credit ψ, the
wage to the worker w, and the price for the good P, are derived in the
same manner as in the earlier subsections. The price equation remains
a simple rule, as in the LGmodel, that is a function of themarginal utility
of the search good Φ:
Price : P ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦ: ð37Þ
Wages now incorporate the value of recoverable search costs in the
ﬁnancial markets, Jv = K(ϕ). Assuming a wage rule where the wage re-
mains constant in stages g and π, and is negotiated in stage g to satisfy
the Nash sharing rule:
1−αLð Þ Wn0−Wuð Þ ¼ αL Jg− Jv
 
one obtains a wage equation:
w ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ−αL r þ sC
 
K þ αL−αG
1−αG
Q 0gxP ð38Þand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Table 1
Calibration targets: monthly frequency.
Market Calibration target Model Year UK SPA GER
Credit Finance's share in GDP Σ 2005 .024 .016 .018
2014 .025 .013 .014
Credit matching rate p 2005 1/6 1/6 1/6
Search for credit ratio κB/κI 2005 1 1 1
Labor Unemployment rate U 2005 .048 .092 .110
2014 .062 .245 .050
Job ﬁnding rate f 2005 .164 .167 .064
2014 .128 .070 .103
Job vacancy rate V 2005 .022 .008 .032
2014 .023 .006 .029
Wages' share in GDP Wgdp 2005 .578 .532 .551
2014 .567 .515 .567
Ratio unemployment beneﬁts over
wages
z/w 2005 .24 .46 .31
Recruiting costs γV=w 2005 .036 .036 .036
Goods Ratio of capacity utilization μG 2005 .795 .803 .840
2014 .820 .757 .840
Numeraire's share in expenditures N 2005 .313 .336 .344
2014 .323 .374 .358
Table 2
Parameter values under monthly calibration.
Parameters Year UK SPA GER
Fixed parameters Discount rate r Both .0033 .0033 .0033
Credit separation rate sC Both .0028 .0034 .0011
Bank's bargaining
weight
αC Both .5 .5 .5
Productivity x Both 1 1 1
Quantity of numeraire y0 Both 1/12 1/12 1/12
Marginal utility of
consumption
Φ Both 1.15 1.15 1.15
Pure-taste shock rate τ Both .01 .01 .01
Parameters calibrated
to 2005 and then
kept ﬁxed for 2014
Credit matching factor χC Both .17 .17 .17
Credit search effort κI Both .23 .29 .30
Vacancy posting cost γ Both .23 .55 .15
Unemployment
beneﬁts
z Both .034 .056 .040
Calibrated parameters Project screening cost κB 2005 .23 .29 .30
2014 .22 .28 .10
Job separation rate sL 2005 .005 .014 .007
2014 .006 .019 .004
Labor matching factor χL 2005 .24 .57 .12
2014 .21 .46 .14
Worker's bargaining
weight
αL 2005 .88 .94 .94
2014 .90 .98 .90
Goods matching
factor
χG 2005 .11 .18 .14
2014 .13 .18 .12
Consumer's
bargaining power
αG 2005 .82 .83 .84
2014 .83 .81 .85
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wagewhen goodsmarket frictionsdisappear (λ→ ∞), to thewage in the
LGmodel when ﬁnancial frictions disappear (K→0), and to the conven-
tional Pissarides wage when both goods and ﬁnancial frictions
disappear.
4.4. Viability of the market
The ﬁnal step is tomake sure that a positive labormarket tightness is
possible in equilibrium. Replacing wage and prices in the entry Eq. (11)
and taking the limitwhen θ tends to zero, onewants the right-hand side
to be larger than the left-hand side. At zero tightness, one has rWu ¼ zþ
y0; w= (1−αL)z−αL(r+ s
C)K+ (αL−αG)Qg′x(1−αG)Φ; hence xP−
w ¼ xð1−αGÞΦ½1−ðαL−αGÞQ 0g −ð1−αLÞzþ αLðr þ sCÞK and ﬁnally
the viability condition is a sufﬁciently high value of x relative to z:
K 1−QπQg
 þ 1−αLð Þz−αL r þ sC
 
K þ αL−αGð ÞQ 0gx 1−αGð ÞΦ−sLK
r þ sL þ sC þ λ
 !
b
x 1−αGð ÞΦ 1− αL−αGð ÞQ 0g
h i
− 1−αLð Þzþ αL r þ sC
 
K þ sLK
r þ sL þ sC þ sG
0
@
1
A:
ð39Þ
In a perfect goods market, when λ→∞ , sG = 0, and αG = 0, this vi-
ability condition states that the annuity value of credit costs must equal
the production surplus:
r þ sC Kb xΦ−z:
Further, assuming the absence of credit frictions (K= 0), we obtain
the familiar condition that the utility from market production should
exceed the utility from leisure.
5. A quantitative exploration of the role of complementarities
between the three markets
We propose in this section to calibrate the CLG model for three
European economies that display strong structural differences in
terms of the three markets at stake: the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Spain. We use data mainly provided by Eurostat, which will be de-
scribed in Section 5.1. For each country, we run a ﬁrst calibration
targeting 2005 data. Based on the results, some structural parameters
are ﬁxed and a second calibration is run with 2014 targets. This allows
for a comparison between the three economies at two different points
in time, before and after the peak of the ﬁnancial crisis.
The results obtained will then be used to proceed to different nu-
merical exercises, as described in Section 5.2. First, we can quantify
the relative weight of each type of friction in the entry decision of
ﬁrms in the three countries studied. Themodel also allows us to analyze
the interdependence of the credit, labor, and goods markets. We will in
particular focus on the impact of each type of friction on the unemploy-
ment rate.
5.1. Calibration strategy for three countries: Germany, UK, and Spain
The time period is monthly. In each of the frictional markets, we as-
sumematching functions such that: pðϕÞ ¼ χC=
ﬃﬃﬃ
ϕ
p
, qðθÞ ¼ χL=
ﬃﬃﬃ
θ
p
, and
λðξÞ ¼ χG
ﬃﬃ
ξ
p
¼ χG. Table 1 summarizes the targets used for the calibra-
tion. Table 2 displays the resulting parameter values.
We ﬁrst ﬁx a set of parameters that will remain unchanged across
the two time periods considered. This set includes, in the credit market,
(i) the discount rate r, taken as homogenous across the three countries
and matching U.S. T-bill interest rates; (ii) the creditor's bargaining
power parameter αC, assuming an equal share of surplus betweenPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006entrepreneur and creditor; and (iii) the credit separation rate sC, con-
stant over the years but varying across countries following data de-
scribed in Appendix G. In addition, the level of productivity in
producing the search good, x, is normalized to 1, and the quantity of
numeraire in the economy y0 is such that agents receive one unit per
year. The marginal utility of consuming the frictional good, Φ, and the
pure taste shock rate, τ, are set as in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2015).
We then proceed to calibrating a second set of parameters that are
assumed to be constant over the time frame of interest (2005 to 2014)
to empirical targetsmeasured in 2005. The parameters are: (i) the credit
matching parameter χC; (ii) the effort cost of search for credit κI; (iii)
the vacancy posting costγ, and; (iv) the level of unemployment beneﬁts
z. These four parameters are linked to four empirical moments in 2005:
(i) the average length of search for credit (through the credit matching
rate p); (ii) the search for credit ratio κB/κI; (iii) the size of recruitingand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Table 3
Measuring the respective role of market frictions in each market: decomposition of the
three components of entry costs in 2014
Static decomposition of each block Credit Labor Goods Sum
Share of entry costs due to each
friction
UK 51.6% 12.4% 36.0% 100%
in Eq. (40) Ger 41.9% 15.8% 42.3% 100%
Spa 80.4% 4.3% 15.3% 100%
Limit cases of an economy with
only one friction
C model L model G model Sum
Size of entry costs in limiting cases
relative to total
UK 50.8% 14.5% 48.0% 113.3%
initial entry costs in Eq. (40) when
χj,χj′→+∞
Ger 40.9% 18.0% 51.7% 110.7%
in pairs for for j,j′=C,L,G, and j ≠ j′ Spa 80.3% 5.3% 36.3% 121.9%
Note: C (resp. L, G) model refers to an economy with only credit (respectively labor,
goods) frictions.
Table 4
Summary of the approximation of entry costs decomposition.
Market Original cost
term
(Approximated) main
component
Variations
with K
Variations
with θ
Credit ð1þ rþsCq ÞK CðKÞ ¼ K ↑ −
Labor γ
qðθÞ LðθÞ ¼ γqðθÞ − ↑
Goods 1
1−QπQg
ð wg−sLKrþsCþsLþλÞ Gðθ;KÞ ¼
wg ðθ;KÞ
λ
↓ ↑
9T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxcosts γV=w; and (iv) the ratio of unemployment beneﬁts over wages
z/w.
Finally, a third set of parameters are allowed to vary over time,
matching the value of empirical targets measured ﬁrst in 2005 and
then again in 2014. These parameters are: (i) the project screening
cost κB; (ii) the job separation rate sL; (iii) the labor matching param-
eter χL; (iv) the worker's wage bargaining power αL; (v) the goods
matching parameter χG, and; (vi) the goods market bargaining pa-
rameter αG. The empirical targets are, ﬁrst, the ﬁnancial sector's
share in GDP Σ ¼ ψN π−wN g−γV−κBBc
y0þxPN π−γV−κBBc
. Second, the unemployment rate
U . Third, the the job ﬁnding rate f. Fourth, the share of wages in
GDPWgdp ¼ ð1−UÞwy0þxPN π−γV−κBBc. Fifth, the rate of capacity utilization μG,
and ﬁnally, sixth, the share of expenditure on numeraire goods in
total expenditures, denoted N. We provide more details on the cali-
bration in Appendix G, and report the values of endogenous variables
in Appendix Table A.1 for completeness.
5.2. Exploring the role of frictions and their interactions
5.2.1. Decomposing the three components of entry costs
The entry Eq. (11) has three separate blocks on the left-hand side,
reﬂecting the intensity of the entry cost due to credit, labor, and goods
markets frictions:
1þ r þ s
C
q
 
K þ γ
q
þ 1
1−QπQg
wg−sLK
r þ sC þ sL þ λ
 
¼ Qg
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLK
r þ sT
 
ð40Þ
This equation also displays some interesting interaction effects be-
tween frictions in separate markets. For instance, the degree of labor
market frictions ampliﬁes themarginal effect of credit frictions summa-
rized inK. Indeed, the lower q is, thehigherwill be the effect ofK on total
entry costs, as the cost of credit from longer periods of search in the
labor market will increase. Hence, labor frictions impact both in the
ﬁrst term and in the second term of the entry side of the equation. Sim-
ilarly, since entry wages are determined taking into account costs K, as
in Eq. (38), higher ﬁnancial frictionsK reduce futurewages. This reduces
entry costs associatedwith goodsmarket frictions (the third entry cost),
and therefore leads to a partial substitutability between goods and ﬁ-
nancial markets.
We can compute the relative weight of each of the three blocks in the
total entry costs faced by theﬁrm as follows. In a purely accounting sense,
each type of frictions is associated with an identiﬁable term in the sum of
entry costs: ð1þ rþsCq ÞK for credit, γq for labor, and 11−QπQg ð
wg−sLK
rþsCþsLþλÞ for
goods. This is illustrated in theﬁrst part of Table 3,which reports themar-
ket friction's share of total entry costs for each country to which we have
calibrated the model. By construction, the sum reaches 100%.
We reach a similar conclusion when we try to isolate the contribu-
tion of each individual friction to total entry costs. To do this, the
model can be solved in different particular cases where matching efﬁ-
ciency parameters χC, χL, or χG tend to inﬁnity (i.e., the corresponding
market becomes frictionless), while all other parameters are held con-
stant. Along the way, the endogenous variables (wages, tightness, and
transition rates) also change, themselves affecting the value of each
component of the entry cost. For instance, having χC andχL go simulta-
neously to inﬁnity leaves only the entry costs due to the initial deﬁcit of
ﬁrms trying to sell, and focuses on the role of goods market entry costs.
Similarly, havingχL andχG go to inﬁnity gives the role of the entry costs
due to the credit frictions. In each limiting case the value of the entry
cost is compared to the total entry cost from its three components of
computed prior to removing the frictions (i.e., the total cost from
Eq. (40)). The results of this exercise are reported in the lower panelPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006of Table 3. Note that now the sum of all columns need not be 100%,
and is actually larger than 100%.
Interestingly, the share of labor market costs is small compared to
the share due to the other frictions. In Spain especially, the labor block
is of limited importance, while the ﬁnancial block contributes over
80% of the entry cost. Thismay be due to the fact that, in 2014, the Span-
ish economy was more adversely affected by the ﬁnancial crisis which
severely affected banks. The fact that the goods market block is higher
in the second part of the table for all countries, especially Spain, comes
from the fact that labor and credit frictions reducedwages overall. Shut-
ting them off leads to a higher entry wage, and therefore magniﬁes
goods market frictions relative to the benchmark case.5.2.2. Further discussion of calibration results
The results presented in Table 3 deserve somemore intuition. In par-
ticular, we try to analyze why the differences in targets for the three
countries lead to the obtained differences in the decomposition. Focus-
ing on themain drivers of each component (C,L,G) of the entry equation
yields valuable insights. An approximation of each term and its varia-
tions with respect to K and θ are reported in Table 4. First, the credit
term ð1þ rþsCq ÞK depends principally on the cost K since the parameter-
ization is such that r+ sC remains numerically small compared to q. Sec-
ond, the labor term γq is increasing in labor market tightness θ because
recruiting is more difﬁcult in a tighter market. Finally, the goodsmarket
term 11−QπQg ð
wg−sLK
rþsCþsLþλÞ is numerically equivalent to its undiscounted ver-
sion wg/λ. Goods market tightness, and therefore λ, is pinned down in
the model by parameters unrelated to labor market tightness and K.
The Nash bargainedwage, on the other hand, depends onmarket condi-
tions in both the labor and creditmarkets and they affect the outside op-
tions of workers and ﬁrms. As shown in Section 4.3, the wage is
increasing in labor market tightness through the termWu, the outside
option for the worker, and decreasing in ﬁnancial costs K, the outside
option for the ﬁrm.
An approximated version of the sum of entry costs is reported in
Table 4 and can be written as CðK↑Þ þ Lðθ↑Þ þ Gðθ↑;K↓Þ where the ar-
rows in the subscripts indicate the variations of each cost with respectand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Table 5
Ampliﬁcation effects of supply shocks through their supplementary impact on consumer's
income anddemand for goods. Variation in labormarket tightnesswhen doubling the sep-
aration rates sL and sC individually or in combination.
% change in θ when doubling
labor and credit turnover in
π k= s,d
Decomposition
Classical effect, supply driven k= s Consumption effect,
demand driven k= d
UK skL × 2 −11.6% 0.706 0.294
sk
C × 2 −9.8% 0.821 0.179
sk
C,skL × 2 −20.4% 0.772 0.228
Germany skL × 2 −10.2% 0.719 0.281
sk
C × 2 −4.5% 0.825 0.175
sk
C,skL × 2 −14.2% 0.758 0.242
Spain skL × 2 −36.1% 0.806 0.194
sk
C × 2 −11.3% 0.853 0.147
sk
C,skL × 2 −43.9% 0.830 0.170
Classical effect: contribution of supply-driven separations, keeping demand-driven sepa-
rations sG = sdL + sdC + τ ﬁxed. Consumption effect: contribution of demand-driven sepa-
rations, keeping supply-driven separations ssL , ssC ﬁxed.
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the UK or Germany concerns the labor market component. Keeping K
constant, there are indeed smaller differences in credit market targets.
Lower labor market tightness, as observed in Spain, has no effect on
entry costs from the credit market. However, It does reduces goods
and labor costs through a greater speed of matching for ﬁrms in the
labor market. The share of each friction in Spain, obtained by dividing
each component by the total entry cost, is a higher share of credit fric-
tions, and a lower share for labor and goods frictions. Targets differ
less between the UK and Germany. To compare the two in terms of
entry costs, one can consider both higher labor market tightness and
lower ﬁnancial costs in Germany relative to the UK. Thus the approxi-
mation predicts a lower share of credit frictions, and a higher share of
labor and goods frictions, in Germany compared to the UK, just as was
found and reported in Table 3.
In sum, these examples shed light on an interesting feature of the
CLGmodel compared to the classical searchmodel. In the benchmark
model, it is difﬁcult to sustain a high unemployment level in equilib-
rium, since it implies that vacancies are ﬁlled quickly and that wages
are low, making it attractive for ﬁrms to enter and thus eventually
reducing unemployment. In contrast, the incorporation of other fric-
tions in the CLG model makes it possible to reach a high unemploy-
ment rate in equilibrium, as illustrated with the case of Spain. In
fact, each friction's contribution to total entry costs responds to
labor market conditions, but the response of the credit market fric-
tion is negligible. As a result, high credit costs can generate high un-
employment equilibria. Further, the share of credit costs in total
entry costs becomes all the more important when unemployment
is high (since the other two shrink). Hence, a severe labor market re-
cession can be triggered by a ﬁnancial crisis, as it was the case in
Spain.
5.2.3. Demand side effects: how consumer income shocks affect entry and
unemployment
Another exercise is to attempt to isolate the role of income shocks
through the demand for search goods by consumers. In Eq. (40), this
can be seen by observing that in total separations sT= sL+ sC+ sG=
2sL + 2sC + τ, the terms sC and sL arise twice. This is due to the fact
that the corresponding shocks, a separation in the credit market or
the labor market, affect proﬁts in two different ways. Once directly,
as they capture the risk of labor turnover and credit market shocks
on the expected revenue of the ﬁrm itself. Second indirectly, as
these shocks affect consumers through their own ﬁrms, leading to a
loss of income and the separation of the consumption relation. To de-
compose the two effects, it is useful to introduce a subscript, s, to the
turnover shocks for the supply's direct effect on ﬁrms. We refer
to this as the “classical effect.” A demand side effect arises through
separations indicated with the subscript d and summarized in sG =
τ + sdL + sdC. We refer to this as the “consumption effect.” We thus
have, with this new notation:
sT ¼ sLs þ sCs þ sG ¼ sLs þ sCs þ τ þ sLd þ sCd
The respective roles of these two shocks on the ﬁrm and on its con-
sumer's income can be explored as follows. First, one can calculate the
rise in labormarket tightness induced by doubling labor and credit turn-
over shocks skL,skC , for both k= s,d, and keeping the rate of change in con-
sumer taste constant τ. The ﬁrst column in Table 4 calculates the
percentage change in labor market tightness from these comparative
static exercises. The effect of increasing both turnover rates simulta-
neously leads to a decrease of equilibrium labor market tightness. In
the case of the UK, this is a 20.4% decline, 14.2% in Germany, and a larger
43.9% in Spain. The last two columns of Table 5 decompose the effect
with a part due to only the supply side, thusmaintaining sG= sdL+ sdC+ τ
τ ﬁxed, and the residual part where only sG changes. The classical effect
is responsible for the largest share of the decline in labor marketPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006tightness, ranging between 70% and 85% depending on the country.
Nonetheless, the demand effect is a non-negligible component of the ef-
fect of turnover on labor market tightness. These results provide an
upper boundon the depressing effect of the lack of consumption sharing
in this economy.
5.2.4. The respective role of each friction on unemployment
Themodel in steady-state offers comparative statics exercises for the
respective role of different frictions. Investigating the impact of each
friction separately or simultaneously is likely to deliver different out-
comes because of potential interactions among the frictions. As said
above, there is both complementarity and substitutability across
frictions.
To better understand the pattern of complementarity, we represent
in Fig. 2 the left-hand side (costs) and the right-hand side (proﬁts) of
the entry equation, as a function of labor market tightness, and double
the efﬁciency of the three markets one by one. The solid lines are the
entry and proﬁt curves in the benchmark economy. The dashed lines
represent the same curve after a doubling of the efﬁciency of each mar-
ket separately: respectively, credit, labor, and goodsmarket when going
from left to right.
It can be seen that the greatest impact on curves is the effect of a
change in the efﬁciency of credit market matching. This shifts entry
down, as expected, since a 1% increase in χC reduces K by the same
amount, and these costs represent more than 50% of total entry
costs. However, the total effect on labor market tightness is not
large. This is because the higher efﬁciency of matching in the credit
market is partly offset by lower future proﬁts, due to higher wages
and a lower “recovery value” after labor separation. In contrast,
changes in the efﬁciency of labor markets reduces entry costs as
well. This leads to larger increases in labor market tightness, with
no impact on the proﬁt curve. Finally, an increase in the efﬁciency
of goods market matching has both a downward effect on costs and
an ambiguous effect on proﬁts as part of the effect appears in
wages. However, the latter effect is small and, overall, themain effect
is to increase labor market tightness as well.
Table 6 shows the effects of varyingmatching efﬁciency in eachmar-
ket on labormarket tightness. The slope of this effect varies across coun-
tries, but a 10% increase in matching efﬁciency in credit market raises
tightness by 8.6% in the UK, 7% in Germany, and 7.6% in Spain (implying
elasticities of, respectively, 0.86, 0.7, and 0.76). Note that this effect de-
clineswith the size of the efﬁciency increase. Similarly, a 10% increase in
matching efﬁciency in labor market raises tightness by 9.3% in the UK,
8.5% in Germany, and a larger 30.5% in Spain (implying elasticities of,and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Fig. 2. Effect of doubling eachmatching efﬁciency parameter χj, j= C,L,G on the entry costs curve and the proﬁt curve as a function of labor market tightness. Left charts: doubling credit
matching efﬁciency; middle charts: doubling labor matching efﬁciency; right charts: doubling goods matching efﬁciency.
11T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxrespectively, 0.93, 0.85, and 3.05). Finally, an increase in goods market
efﬁciency generates an increase in labor market tightness of 20.1%,
17.3%, and 30.5% (implying elasticities of, respectively, 2.01, 1.73, and
3.05). Larger elasticities correspond to the case of smaller total surplus
(especially for Spain) and the friction considered having a greater im-
pact on that surplus; with small surpluses, the economy ismore volatile
to shocks. Note also that cross-market effects tend to attenuate each
other: lower frictions in one market reduce the marginal impact of re-
ducing frictions in another market. This effect comes from the wage ef-
fect of frictions. Higher efﬁciency of matching raises wages throughTable 6
Percentage (log-variation) in θ from changes in matching efﬁciency.
% Δχj, j= C,L,G UK Germany
+10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +
One parameter increases
Δθ
ΔχC
8.6 7.9 7.5 6.6 7.0
Δθ
ΔχL
9.3 8.4 8.0 7.0 8.5
Δθ
ΔχG
20.1 18.6 17.7 15.7 17.3 1
Two parameters increase: complementarities
Δ2θ
ΔχCΔχL
−4.6 −4.0 −3.8 −3.3 −4.7 −
Δ2θ
ΔχCΔχG
−4.6 −4.1 −3.9 −3.4 −3.4 −
Δ2θ
ΔχLΔχG
−9.5 −8.8 −8.4 −7.5 −8.2 −
Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006both lower K and higher θ, and the second-order derivatives of θ with
respect to two frictions are negative. In the case of ﬁxed wages, one
would have instead Δ
2θ
ΔχCΔχL
¼ Δ2θΔχGΔχL ¼ 0, while elasticities of labor mar-
ket tightness to efﬁciency ofmatching is typically 10 times higher, an ef-
fect well known in the literature following Shimer (2005) and Hall
(2005).
Finally, and as expected from Fig. 2, the main effect on unemploy-
ment reported in Table 7 comes from reducing labor market frictions,
despite the potentially larger impact of credit market frictions: reducing
credit market frictions pushes entry cost down on the credit side, butSpain
33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100
6.4 6.0 5.3 7.6 6.9 6.6 5.8
7.7 7.3 6.4 30.5 27.8 26.3 23.1
5.9 15.2 13.5 30.5 28.3 27.0 24.1
3.6 −3.5 −3.1 −12.9 −11.9 −11.4 −10.1
2.5 −2.3 −2.0 −12.8 −11.7 −11.0 −9.7
7.6 −7.3 −6.5 −12.9 −12.0 −11.5 −10.3
and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
Table 8
Robustness of the decomposition in terms of the share of entry costs.
Friction UK Germany Spain
C L G Sum C L G Sum C L G Sum
Benchmark 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Finance's share in GDP
Σ×2 45.9 13.2 40.9 100 34.4 17.4 48.2 100 78.1 4.8 17.2 100
Σ/10 56.6 11.5 31.9 100 47.5 14.5 38.0 100 82.7 3.8 13.5 100
Credit-search costs
κB = 2κI 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
κB = κI/2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.8 15.8 42.4 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Credit ﬁnding rate
p × 2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
p/2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.8 15.8 42.4 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Creditor's bargaining power
αC = 0.8 51.3 12.4 36.3 100 41.1 15.6 43.3 100 80.9 4.2 15.0 100
αC = 0.2 50.5 12.5 37.0 100 41.5 16.2 42.3 100 78.9 4.7 16.4 100
Quantity of numeraire
y0 2 51.7 12.4 35.8 100 42.3 15.8 41.9 100 80.4 4.3 15.2 100
y0 /2 50.7 12.5 36.8 100 35.9 16.9 47.2 100 80.3 4.4 15.4 100
Marginal utility of search good
Φ= 1.2 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Φ= 1.1 51.6 12.4 36.0 100 41.9 15.8 42.3 100 80.4 4.3 15.3 100
Table 7
Unemployment rate effect of increase in matching efﬁciency.
Baseline rate [−0.075in] % Δχj UK: 6.2 Germany: 5.0 Spain: 24.5
+10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100 +10 +33 +50 +100
j= C,L,G
χC 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 24.4 24.3 24.2 24.1
χL 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.1 4.5 3.7 3.3 2.5 22.5 19.0 17.0 13.0
χG 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 24.2 23.7 23.5 22.9
χC, χL 5.6 4.6 4.1 3.0 4.5 3.7 3.3 2.4 22.4 18.8 16.8 12.8
χL, χG 5.6 4.5 4.0 3.0 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.4 22.2 18.4 16.3 12.1
χC, χG 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.7 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 24.1 23.5 23.2 22.6
χC, χL, χG 5.6 4.5 3.9 2.9 4.5 3.6 3.2 2.3 22.2 18.2 16.1 12.0
12 T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthe rise in wages mitigates this effect and ex-post turns out to almost
eliminate the gains. In particular, in the UK, doubling the efﬁciency of
goods and credit markets would reduce the rate of unemployment by
3.1 percentage points. In Germany, the effect would be 2.5 percentage
points. In Spain, the effect would be 11.5 percentage points.
5.3. Robustness to variations in targets or in ﬁxed parameters
The robustness of our results is tested by varying the parameters for
which we either have no target in the data or uncertain targets.
From top to bottom, Table 8 shows the decomposition of the three
entry costs to: a doubling or a division by 10 of the share of ﬁnance
(business sector) in GDP5; a doubling or a division by 2 of the relative
costs of credit search of creditors relative to projects/ﬁrms; a doubling
or a division by 2 of the transition rate of projects/ﬁrms from search
for credit to the labor stage; a change of the bargaining power of credi-
tors vis-à-vis the ﬁrm to 0.9 or 0.2; a doubling or a division by 2 of the5 We had attributed half of the total ﬁnance share to the business sector, the other half
being, in national accounts, services to consumers. This is close to the division for U.S. data
but not necessarily applicable to the countries studied here. Note that reducing the value
added of the ﬁnancial sector relative to GDP raises the prospection costs in the calibration
when αC is ﬁxed. Doing so reduces the proﬁt margins of the ﬁnancial sector, which in turn
raises the share of credit in total entry costs.
Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006exogenous injections of Lucas fruits into the economy, and ﬁnally, a
change in themarginal utility of search goods by 10% or 20%. As is ap-
parent, changes in the decomposition are rarely important compared
to the benchmark case. In some cases, they are even totally neutral-
ized in the entry equation by proportional comovements of the
three components, as is the case for changes in the marginal utility
of search goods or varying the duration of credit search 1/p. The
same conclusion is reached when replicating the decomposition
exercise reported in the lower part of Table 3. See Table A.2 in the
Appendix for the detailed results.6. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simpliﬁed structure for complex econ-
omies with imperfect credit, labor, and goods markets. We have
shown how to solve them in the steady-state with a rich structure
of bargaining over prices, wages, and ﬁnancial repayments, and in
the presence of turnover rates speciﬁc to each phase of the ﬁrm,
thus generalizing our previous approach (Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2015)). We then apply this model by calibrating it to
three European economies.
We ﬁnd that, for these countries, goods and credit market frictions
are a dominant share of entry costs leading to the creation of jobs. As
a result, we conclude that they deserve much more attention in theand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
13T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxquantitative macroeconomic literature. Along similar lines, Pissarides
(2009) showed how noncyclical entry costs considerably improve
the ﬁt of the search and matching model to U.S. data. Our work pro-
vides a micro-foundatio for such costs built on search friction cred-
it and goods markets.We also ﬁnd that demand side effects,
through individual income shocks that affect the demand for
goods, are an element of the data but are not extremely important.
They account for, at most, 15% to 25% of the effect of job destruction
shocks on aggregate labor market tightness. Lastly, we ﬁnd that the
respective speeds of matching in the goods market and the credit
market both have small effects on labor market tightness, and
this represents weak margins to improve outcomes such as the
level of unemployment. Increasing the speed of matching in the
labor market is the most effective. The general conclusion is that
the richer models of the CLG type considerably improve our quan-
titative understanding of the labor market equilibrium.
Appendix A. Demand and supply of numeraire
The unemployed can transform part or all their leisure endowment z
into additional production of the numeraire. This ﬁxes the demand and
supply of the numeraire. Denote by dz this fraction transformed into
numeraire, where d might be smaller or larger than 1 (in the latter
case the unemployed would enjoy negative leisure, that is exert more
effort than the employed workers). They therefore supply zdþ y0
units of good 0, and receive in turn a ﬂow utility vð0; y0 þ zd; zð1−dÞÞ.
Under the additional assumption that leisure and consumption of
good 0 are additively separable in the utility function, the value of d is
irrelevant hereafter in the utility of the unemployed. However, as
shown below, this value matters to equalize the demand and supply
of the numeraire.
Since it is assumed there is no saving or pooling of income across in-
dividuals, a consumer not matched with a search good spends his dis-
posable income denoted by w on the numeraire. Thus, c0U ¼ wþ y0 .
Matched consumers must sacriﬁce some consumption of the essential
good in order to buy the search good. Thus, the consumption of good
0 of a matched consumer is c0M ¼ c0U−Px ¼ y0 þw−Px.
We denote byC1 ¼ xDM the aggregate consumption of search goods
1. The aggregate consumption of good 0 is given by
C0 ¼ U þDUð Þy0 þDUwþDM y0 þw−Px
 
:
It is the sum of individual consumption of the unemployed, of the un-
matched consumers, and of the matched consumers. The above equation
implies that the supply of numeraire zdU þ y0 equals its demand. Using
U þDU þDM ¼ 1, the equality implies DUwþDMðw−PxÞ ¼ zdU or
equivalently
Nw−DMPx ¼ zdU:
This equation states that the revenue from ﬁrms net of expenses into
the search good are spent in the supplementary numeraire provided by
the transformation of leisure of the unemployed. Therefore, d adjusts
here to equalize demand and supply of the numeraire. It is important
to note that, once the fraction d of leisure transformed into numeraire
to equalize demand and supply is determined, its value disappears
from the rest of the model. Only z will affect the equilibrium wages
and therefore labor market tightness.
Appendix B. The general entry equation
We have the fundamental Bellman equations:
rEc ¼−κ I þ p ϕð Þ Ev−Ecð Þ ð41ÞPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006rEv ¼−γ þ γ þ q Eg−Ev
 þ sCv Ec−Evð Þ ð42Þ
rEg ¼−wg þwg þ λ Eπ−Eg
 þ sCg Ec−Eg þ sLg Ev−Eg  ð43Þ
rEπ ¼ xP−wπ−ψþ sCπ Ec−Eπð Þ þ sG Eg−Eπ
 þ sLπ Ev−Eπð Þ ð44Þ
and
rBc ¼−κB þ ϕp ϕð Þ Bv−Bcð Þ ð45Þ
rBv ¼−γ þ q Bg−Bv
 þ sCv Bc−Bvð Þ ð46Þ
rBg ¼−wg þ λ Bπ−Bg
 þ sCg Bc−Bg þ sLg Bv−Bg  ð47Þ
rBπ ¼ ψþ sCπ Bc−Bπð Þ þ sG Bg−Bπ
 þ sLπ Bv−Bπð Þ ð48Þ
Summing up two-by-two, one obtains the value in the text:
r þ sCv  Jv ¼−γ þ q θð Þ Jg− Jv  ð49Þ
r þ sCg  Jg ¼−wg þ sLg Jv− Jg þ λ Jπ− Jg  ð50Þ
r þ sCπ  Jπ ¼ xP−wπ þ sLπ Jv− Jπð Þ þ sG Jg− Jπ  ð51Þ
Two convenient notations can be introduced: let
Qg ¼
λ
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ ; Qπ ¼
sG
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
which allows to rewrite Eqs. (50) and (51) as
Jg ¼
sLgK−wg
λ
þ Jπ
 
Qg ð52Þ
Jπ ¼
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
þ Jg
 
Qπ : ð53Þ
Solutions follow: one has then
Jg ¼
sLgK−wg
λ
þ xP−wπ þ s
LπK
sG
þ Jg
 
Qπ
 
Qg ð54Þ
Jπ ¼
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
þ s
LgK−wg
λ
þ Jπ
 
Qg
 
Qπ ð55Þ
or after simpliﬁcation:
Jg ¼
Qg
1−QπQg
sLgK−wg
λ
þ xP−wπ þ s
LπK
sG
 
Qπ
 
ð56Þ
Jπ ¼
Qπ
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
þ s
LgK−wg
λ
 
Qg
 
: ð57Þ
Eq. (49) combined with free-entry Jv = K immediately delivers:
1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q
¼ Jg ð58Þ
1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q
¼ Qg
1−QπQg
sLgK−wg
λ
þ xP−wπ þ s
LπK
sG
 
Qπ
 
:
ð59Þand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
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wages wg on the left-hand side and rearranging it, so as to have:
1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q
þ Qg
1−QπQg
wg−sLgK
λ
 
¼ QgQπ
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
ð60Þ
or 1þ r þ s
Cv
q
 
K þ γ
q
þ 1
1−QπQg
wg−sLgK
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ
 
¼ Qg
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
 
ð61Þ
or finally K þ Qv
γ
q
þ QvQg
1−QπQg
wg−sLgK
λ
 
¼ QvQgQπ
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
ð62Þ(69)with ð63Þ
Qg ¼
λ
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ ;Qπ ¼
sG
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG ;Qv ¼
q
r þ sCv þ q : ð64Þ
Appendix C. Stock-ﬂow equations in the extensive margin CLG
model
In this part, we assume from the start the existence of credit shocks
leading to the destruction of theﬁrm in stages g and π. The stock ofﬁrms
in stage π receives the matches created in the goods market and
loses the ﬁrms in stage π, losing their workers , the consumers
quitting the good and ﬁnally the ﬁrms destroyed by credit shocks
. The stock of ﬁrms in stage g receives the hiringsML and the ﬁrms
losing their clients , and loses the matches created in the goods
market and loses the ﬁrms in stage g losing their workers as
well as those hit by a credit shock .
The stock of matched consumers receives thematches created in the
goods market , loses the matched consumers who lost their job
which occurs either with probability sLg or sLπ depending on
whether the consumer is himself/herself in a ﬁrm in stage g or π selling
(hence the compact notation sLg;π ¼ sLgN g þ sLπN π=ðN g þN πÞ for the
expected turnover rate in stage g) and loses the consumers whose
ﬁrm lost their worker ¼ ðsG−τÞDM ; and loses the consumers
who changed taste . The stock of unmatched consumers loses the
matches created in the goods market , gains the matches created
in the labormarketML, gains the consumerswhoseﬁrm lost theirwork-
er and loses the unmatched consumers who lost their job
and gains the consumerswho changed taste . Finally, thepool of un-
employed workers loses the matches creates in the labor marketML,
gains the job losses sLg;πð1−U) which arise, from the ﬁrm side, from
ﬁrms in stage π losing their workers and ﬁrms in stage g losing
their workers ; or from matched consumers losing their job
or from unmatched consumers losing their job :(65)
(66)
Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006ð67Þ
ð68Þ
One can easily verify that ∂N π=∂t þ ∂N g=∂t þ ∂U=∂t ¼ 0 and that ∂
DM=∂t þ ∂DU=∂t þ ∂U=∂t ¼ 0 at the same time.Appendix D. Price determination in CLG
Start from
r þ sCπ  Jπ ¼ xP−wπ þ sLπ Jv− Jπð Þ þ sG Jg− Jπ 
rWn1 ¼ Φ−Pð Þxþ y0 þ sG Wn0−Wn1ð Þ þ sLπ þ sCπ
 
Wu−Wn1ð Þ
and
rWn0 ¼ y0 þwg þ λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ þ sLπ þ sCπ
 
Wu−Wn0ð Þ
r þ sCg þ sLg  Jg ¼−wg þ sLgK þ λ Jπ− Jg :
Note that we needed here sLπ = sLg otherwise two types of con-
sumers. This leads to the ﬁrm's and consumer's consumption surpluses:
r þ sCπ þ sLπ þ sG  Jπ− Jg  ¼ xP−wπ þ sLπK− Jg r þ sCπ þ sLπ 
¼ xP−wπ þ sLπK− −wg þ sLgK þ λ Jπ− Jg
  
r þ sCπ þ sLπ þ sG  Wn1−Wn0ð Þ
¼ Φ−Pð Þxþ y0 þ sLπ þ sCπ
 
Wu−Wn0ð Þ−rWn0
¼ Φ−Pð Þxþ y0 þ sLπ þ sCπ
 
Wu−Wn0ð Þ−ðy0 þ λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ
þ sLπ þ sCπ  Wu−Wn0ð ÞÞ
¼ Φ−Pð Þx−λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ:
Bargaining over prices thus leads to, through (Wn1−Wn0)(1−
αG) = (Jπ− Jg)αG:
αG xP−wπ þ sLπK− −wg þ sLgK þ λ Jπ− Jg
  h i
¼ 1−αGð Þ Φ−Pð Þx−λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ½ 
and ﬁnally leads to:
Px ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦxþ αG wπ−wg−sLπK þ sLgK
 	
:and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
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converges to a constant of parameters,
Px ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦxþ αG sLg−sLπ
 
K
which is even further simpliﬁed when labor turnover is the same in
both stages g and π.
Px ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦx:
Appendix E. Wage determination in stage g of CLG
Assume that the wage remains constant between stages g and π and
utility is linear. The labor surpluses of workers and bargaining ﬁrms are
stages g and π and utility is linear. The labor surpluses of workers and
bargaining ﬁrms are
r þ sLg þ sCg  Wn0−Wuð Þ ¼ y0 þwg þ λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ−rWu
r þ sCg þ sLg  Jg− Jv  ¼ 0−wg þ λ Jπ− Jg − r þ sCg K
with
rWu ¼ y0 þ f Wn0−Wuð Þ:
The capital gain of the worker when (s)he accesses consumption
good 1Wn1−Wn0 is independent of wg. The same is true from the cap-
ital gain of the ﬁrm Jπ− Jg. The maximization of the Nash product in the
labor market therefore leads to: (1−αL)(Wn0−Wu) = αL(Jg− Jv) lead-
ing to:
1−αLð Þ y0 þwg þ λ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ−rWu
 	
¼ αL −wg þ λ Jπ− Jg
 
− r þ sCg Kh i
⇔wg ¼ αL 0− r þ sCg
 
K
 	þ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ
þλαL Jπ− Jg
 
− 1−αLð Þλ Wn1−Wn0ð Þ:
Interestingly, the latter term can be simpliﬁed using the price
bargaining equation, which holds in expectation and in equilibrium, de-
livering the wage equation:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ αL − r þ sCg
 
K
 	
þ λ Jπ− Jg
 αL−αG
1−αG
One can also replace the surplus of the ﬁrm by its forward value,
using again
Jg ¼
Qg
1−QπQg
sLgK−wg
λ
 
þ xP−wπ þ s
LπK
sG
 
Qπ
 
ð70Þ
Jπ ¼
Qπ
1−QπQg
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
þ s
LgK−wg
λ
 
Qg
 
ð71Þ
one has:
Jπ− Jg ¼
1
1−QπQg
"
Qπ
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
þ s
LgK−wg
λ
 
QgQπ−Qg
sLgK−wg
λ
−
xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
QπQg
#
¼ 1
1−QπQg
1−Qg
 	 xP−wπ þ sLπK
sG
 
þ s
LgK−wg
λ
 
QgQπ−Qg
 	 
¼ 1
1−QπQg
 xP−wπ þ s
LπK
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
r þ sLg þ sCg
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ−
sLgK−wg
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ
r þ sLπ þ sCπ
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
 
:Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006Note that
1
1−QπQg
¼ 1
1−
λ
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λ
sG
r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG
¼ r þ s
Lg þ sCg þ λ  r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG 
r þ sLg þ sCg þ λð Þ r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sGð Þ−λsG
¼ r þ s
Lg þ sCg þ λ  r þ sLπ þ sCπ þ sG 
r þ sLg þ sCgð Þ r þ sLπ þ sCπð Þ þ r þ sLg þ sCgð ÞsG þ r þ sLπ þ sCπð Þλ
implying
Jπ− Jg ¼
xP−wπ þ sLπK
 
r þ sLg þ sCg − sLgK−wg  r þ sLπ þ sCπ 
r þ sLg þ sCgð Þ r þ sLπ þ sCπð Þ þ r þ sLg þ sCgð ÞsG þ r þ sLπ þ sCπð Þλ :
Simpliﬁcations arise when assuming identical turnover and credit
shocks in each stage and ﬁnally with equal wages, one has
Jπ− Jg ¼
xP−wπ þ sLK
 
− sLK−wg
 
r þ sL þ sC þ sG þ λ
¼ xP−wπ þwg
r þ sL þ sC þ sG þ λ
¼ xP
r þ sL þ sC þ sG þ λ :
Thewage equation thus becomes, using the notationQ 0g ¼ λrþsLþsCþsGþλ:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ
αL−αG
1−αG
Q 0gxP−αL r þ sCg
 
K
¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ αL−αGð ÞQ 0gxΦ−αL r þ sCg
 
K:
The price was replaced by its equilibrium expression in the last line.
We also have the following simpler cases:
CLG with αL ¼ αG⇒wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ−αL r þ sCg
 
K
LG with K ¼ 0⇒wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ αL−αGð ÞQ 0gxΦ
CL with λ→∞;αG ¼ 0⇒wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ αL xP− r þ sCg
 
K
 	
L with K ¼ 0;λ→∞;αG ¼ 0⇒wg ¼ 1−αLð Þ rWu−y0ð Þ þ αLPx:
One can ﬁnally use the usual simpliﬁcation of the value of unem-
ployment to obtain the equations from the text.
rWu ¼ zþ y0 þ αL1−αL f θð Þ Jg ¼ zþ y
0 þ αL
1−αL
γθ:
Appendix F. Alternative timing for wages and price determination
Assume ﬁrst that wages are different across states g and π. The
goods-market wage is still determined by
wg ¼ argmax Wg0−Wu
 αL Jg− Jv 1−αL
 
: ð72Þ
In regards to wage wπ, three different timings can be explored (see
Brzustowski (2015) for details).
• Timing 1 (wagewπ negotiated before price):Afterwg is determined,
and before havingmet a customer, theworker and the ﬁrm agree on a
wage increasewπ−wg, whichwill take effect as soon as the ﬁrm starts
making proﬁts. The new wage is the outcome of Nash bargaining in
anticipation of the later meeting of a customer.
• Timing 2 (price negotiated before wage wπ): Instead, this is only
once his/her ﬁrm has started making proﬁts by having met the cus-
tomer that the worker renegotiates his/her wage and obtains a
bonus wπ−wg.
• Timing 3 (trilateral bargaining overwπ and price):When amatch is
formed on the goods market, the customer, the ﬁrm's manager, andand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
16 T. Brzustowski et al. / Labour Economics xxx (2016) xxx–xxxtheworker of theﬁrmgather and the three of themnegotiate together
over the price and the new wage.
In what follows, the outcomes of these three timings are presented
independently after some preliminary results proved in Brzustowski
(2015). Deﬁne the surplus of the consumer uponmatchingwith a good:
Wπ1−Wπ0 ¼Wg1−Wg0 ≡ SWM : ð73Þ
Notice that Eq. (73) also implies that the surplus gained by thework-
er of a newly proﬁtable ﬁrm does not depend on his/her consumption
situation:
Wπ1−Wg1 ¼Wπ0−Wg0 ≡ SWπ : ð74Þ
One has:
SWM ¼
x Φ−Pð Þ
r þ sT þ λ ð75Þ
SWπ ¼
wπ−wg
r þ sT þ λ : ð76Þ
These expressions are to be compared with the ﬁrm's surplus upon
matching on the goods market:
Jπ− Jg ¼
xP− wπ−wg
 
r þ sT þ λ : ð77Þ
The goodsmarketwagewg is independent of the future timing of ne-
gotiations. Indeed,
r þ sC þ sL þ θq θð Þ  Wg0−Wu  ¼ wg−zþ λ SWM þ SWπ 
¼ wg−zþ Q 0g x Φ−Pð Þ þ wπ−wg
  	
and using that Jv = K(ϕ), one has:
r þ sC þ sL þ θq θð Þ ð Jg− Jv ¼−wg þ γθ− 1−θð Þ r þ sC K ϕð Þ
þ Q 0g xP− wπ−wg
  	
:
As a result, independently of P and wπ, it is always the case that:
∂ Jg− Jv
 
∂wg
¼−∂ WgU−Wu
 
∂wg
:
It follows that the simple sharing rule in the main text will always
hold:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αL γθ− 1−θð Þ r þ sC
 
K ϕð Þ 
þ Q 0g xP− wπ−wg
 
− 1−αLð ÞxΦ
 	
: ð78Þ
Timing 1. In this case, the newwagewπ is set before the priceP. We de-
note byαLπ the bargainingweight of workers in that stage, to distinguish
it from the above bargaining weight in stage g αL. Reason by backward
induction and derive ﬁrst the price. Everything else having already
been set, Nash bargaining over the price leads to a simple sharing rule,
with αG the bargaining power of the consumer:
1−αGð ÞSWM ¼ αG Jπ− Jg
 
:
Using Eqs. (75) and (77), this yields:
P ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦþ αG wπ−wgx : ð79ÞPlease cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006Then, the new wagewπ can be derived. It is interpreted as an incen-
tive to do a good job, which means that the worker's outside option in
the negotiation is to do a “bad” job and let the ﬁrm remain in stage g.
As a result, the new wage is set as:
wπ ¼ argmax SWπ
 απL Jπ− Jg 1−απL
 
:
Taking into account the price rule (Eq. (79)), one has:
∂ Jπ− Jg
 
∂wπ
¼− 1−αGð Þ ∂S
W
π
∂wπ
:
Hence
απL Jπ− Jg
 
¼ 1−απL
 
1−αGð ÞSWπ :
Finally, one obtains:
απLP ¼ 1−αG 1−απL
  wπ−wg
x
: ð80Þ
The system formed by Eqs. (79) and (80) can be solved to:
wπ−wg
x
¼ απLΦ ð81Þ
P ¼ 1−αG 1−απL
  
Φ: ð82Þ
In this case, the goods-marketwagewghas the following expression:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αL γθ− 1−θð Þ r þ sC
 
K ϕð Þ 
þ Q 0g αL−αG−απL 1−αGð Þ
 
xΦ: ð83Þ
Timing 2. In this case, the new wage wπ is set after the price P. It is as-
sumed for simplicity that theworker's outside option in this negotiation
is to make the ﬁrm remain in stage g. This corresponds to the case of a
strike: the worker refuses to serve the customer as long as (s)he has
not gotten a wage increase. It could also be assumed that, rather than
going on strike, the worker threatens to resign. However, this would
lead to more complicated results. The derivation of the results under
timing 2 follows a very similar structure to timing 1 and is left to the
reader, who will obtain:
Bonus rule:
wπ−wg
x
¼ απLP: ð84Þ
Price rule:
1−απL 1−αGð Þ
 P ¼ 1−αGð Þ 1−απL Φþ αG wπ−wgx : ð85Þ
The system formed by Eqs. (84) and (85) can be solved to:
wπ−wg
x
¼ 1−αGð ÞαπLΦ ð86Þ
P ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦ: ð87Þ
In this case, the goods-marketwagewghas the following expression:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αL γθ− 1−θð Þ r þ sC
 
K ϕð Þ 
þ Q 0g αL−αG−απL 1−αGð Þ
 
xΦ: ð88Þ
This is exactly the same expression as in timing 1.and credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
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of a three-party Nash bargaining:
wπ ;Pð Þ ¼ argmax SWM
 αG SWπ απL Jπ− Jg 1−αG−απL
 
:
The solution couple ðwπ ;PÞ will thus verify:
1−αG−απL
 SWM ¼ αG Jπ− Jg 
1−αG−απL
 SWπ ¼ απL Jπ− Jg :
It follows that the bonus-rule/price-rule system takes the form:
1−απL
 P ¼ 1−αG−απL Φþ αG wπ−wgx ð89Þ
απLP ¼ 1−αGð Þ
wπ−wg
x
: ð90Þ
This solves to:
wπ−wg
x
¼ απLΦ: ð91Þ
P ¼ 1−αGð ÞΦ: ð92Þ
In this case, the goods-market wage wg has the following
expression6:
wg ¼ 1−αLð Þzþ αL γθ− 1−θð Þ r þ sC
 
K ϕð Þ 
þ Q 0g αL−αG−απL
 
xΦ: ð93Þ
Appendix G. Calibration Appendix: Source of data
G.1. Credit market parameters
The discount rate r is taken homogenous across countries at
0.0033, which corresponds to an annual 4% rate (U.S. T-bill).
Eurostat's Business demography by size class [bd_9bd_sz_cl_r2] pro-
vides annual data on Employment share of enterprise deaths for busi-
ness economy except activities of holding companies. Dividing the
data by 12, we obtain the model's credit separation rate sC. Eurostat
provides data for the period 2008–2011. Given the small variations
over that period, sC is taken constant between 2005 and 2014, equal
to the average of the data provided by Eurostat for each country. In
the absence of information on the creditor's bargaining power αC, it
is set to 0.5.
Our main target on credit markets is the ﬁnancial sector's share in
GDP, denoted Σ. In the model, the GDP is y0 þ xPN π−γV−κBBc , and
therefore:
Σ ¼ ψN π−wN g−γV−κBBc
y0 þ xPN π−γV−κBBc
:
Data are found in Eurostat's table National accounts aggregates by in-
dustry [nama_10_a64], from which we take half of the value corre-
sponding to ﬁnancial activities. That is, we have assumed that credit
services to households and to businesses yield tantamount revenues.
Finally, in the absence of further evidence, we target an average
six months to ﬁnd credit for an entrepreneur in 2005. The credit-6 Bear in mind that αG and βL have been deﬁned differently in this case.
Please cite this article as: Brzustowski, T., et al., Disentangling goods, labor,
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006matching factor χC is then ﬁxed and this target is relaxed for the
2014 calibration. Similarly, it is assumed that the searching costs
κB and κI are equal in 2005; κI being then ﬁxed and κB relaxed.
G.2. Labor market parameters
We target the unemployment rate U supplied by Eurostat
[une_rt_m] for each country. We follow Shimer (2005)'s method and
use Eurostat's Unemployment by duration of unemployment—quarterly
data from the Labour Force Survey [lfsq_ugad], from which we obtain
quarterly values for the short-term unemployment rate (i.e. the rate of
unemployed persons who have been unemployed for less than one
month), denoted Ub1 Shimer (2005) uses it to estimate the job separa-
tion rate, sC + sL in our model. Instead, we prefer to estimate a target
for the job-ﬁnding rate f, and to let sL be computed by the system. We
consider then the rate of persons unemployed for more than one
month U N1 ¼ U−Ub1. In the model:
U N1t ¼ 1− f t−1ð ÞUt−1:
We have quarterly values for U N1 and monthly values for U . Hence,
values for f at the middle of each quarter can be computed. The annual
averages give us a target for f for each year. We target the job vacancy
rate V given by Eurostat's Job vacancy statistics [jvs_q_nace2].
We target the share of wages in GDPWgdp ¼ ð1−UÞwy0þxPN π−γV−κBBc to cor-
respond to the values found in Eurostat's GDP and main components
(output, expenditure, and income) [namq_10_gdp], which gives quarter-
ly data over 2005–2014 on the compensation of employees' share, taking
into accountwages and salaries as well as employers' social contributions.
Data on unemployment beneﬁt expenditures as a percentage of GDP are
provided by Eurostat [spr_exp_gdp] from which we can estimate the
ratio z/w for 2005. Unemployment beneﬁts z are then ﬁxed for the
2014 calibration. Finally, we target Silva and Toledo (2009)'s estimation
that recruiting costs amount to 3.6% of a monthly wage. The vacancy
posting cost γ is then set constant for 2014.
G.3. Goods market parameters
Themarginal utility of consuming the frictional goodΦ and the pure
taste shock rate τ are taken as constant across countries and set as in
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015). The quantity of numeraire in
the economy y0 is set to 1/12, such that individuals receive one unit of
numéraire per year. The rate of capacity utilization is, in the steady-
state, equal to:
μG ξð Þ ¼
λ ξð Þ
sG þ sLg;π þ λ ξð Þ
and the corresponding numbers are provided by Eurostat [ei_bsin_q_r2].
We target the share of the numeraire in total expendituresN taken from
Eurostat's Final consumption expenditure of households by consumption
purpose (COICOP 3 digit) [nama_10_co3_p3]. The numeraire is assumed
to correspond to the following categories (COICOP):
• Food and non-alcoholic beverages
• Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and narcotics
• Water supply and miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling
• Electricity, gas, and other fuels
• Hospital services
• Operation of personal transport equipment
• Transport services
• Postal services
• Educationand credit market frictions in three European economies, Labour Econ.
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• Social protection
Appendix H. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.006.
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